(Sec. 2) St. Joseph College vs. SJC Workers, GR 155609, Jan 17, 2005
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit Catholic educational institution while respondent is a legitimate labor organization which is currently the official bargaining representative of all employees of petitioner except the faculty and consultants of the Graduate School, managerial employees and those who occupy confidential positions. Respondent has an existing CBA with petitioner for the period from June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2004. For the SY 2000-2001, petitioner increased its tuition fees for all its departments. Based on petitioner’s computation, the incremental proceeds from the tuition fees increase for SY 2000-2001 is P1,560,942.74, 85% of which is equivalent to P1,326,801.33. Consequently, respondent averred that 85% of P4,906,307.58, which is P4,170,360.59 should have been released to its members as provided for in their CBA effective June 1, 2000.
ISSUE: How should the 70%-30% tuition fee increase be allocated?
RULING:
The law allows an increase in school tuition fees on the condition that 70 percent of the increase shall go to the payment of personnel benefits. Plainly unsupported by the law or jurisprudence is petitioner’s contention that the payment of such benefits should be based not only on the rate of tuition fee increases, but also on other factors like the decrease in the number of enrollees; the number of those exempt from paying the fees, like scholars; the number of dropouts who, as such, do not pay the whole fees; and the bad debts incurred by the school. The financial dilemma of petitioner may deserve sympathy and support, but its remedy lies not in the judiciary but in the lawmaking body.
The law plainly states that 70 percent of the tuition fee increase shall be allotted for the teaching and the nonteaching personnel; and that the payment of other costs of operation, together with the improvement of the school’s infrastructure, shall be taken only from the remaining 30 percent. The law does not speak, directly or indirectly, of the contention of petitioner that in the event that its total tuition income is lesser than that in the previous year, then the whole amount of the increase in tuition fee, and not merely up to 30 percent as provided by law, may be used for the improvement and modernization of infrastructure and for the payment of other costs of operation.
(Sec. 4) CIR vs. CA , G.R. No. 95022 207 Scra 487
Petitioner, seeks a reversal of the Decision of respondent CA, dated Aug. 27, 1990, in CA-G.R. SP No. 20426, entitled "Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. GCL Retirement Plan, represented by its Trustee-Director and the Court of Tax Appeals," which affirmed the Decision of the latter Court, dated 15 December 1986, in Case No. 3888, ordering a refund, in the sum of P11,302.19, to the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income from money market placements and purchase of treasury bills, imposed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1959.
There is no dispute with respect to the facts. Private Respondent, GCL Retirement Plan (GCL, for brevity) is an employees' trust maintained by the employer, GCL Inc., to provide retirement, pension, disability and death benefits to its employees. The Plan as submitted was approved and qualified as exempt from income tax by Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue in accordance with Rep. Act No. 4917.
ISSUE: Are school’s retained earnings tax-exempt?
RULING:
Yes. GCL Plan was qualified as exempt from income tax by the CIR in accordance with Rep. Act. 4917. The tax-exemption privilege of employees' trusts, as distinguished from any other kind of property held in trust, springs from Section 56(b) (now 53[b]) of the Tax Code, “The tax imposed by this Title shall not apply to employee's trust which forms part of a pension, stock bonus or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the benefit of some or all of his employees . . .” And rightly so, by virtue of the raison de'etre behind the creation of employees' trusts. Employees' trusts or benefit plans normally provide economic assistance to employees upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, particularly, old age retirement, death, sickness, or disability. It provides security against certain hazards to which members of the Plan may be exposed. It is an independent and additional source of protection for the working group. What is more, it is established for their exclusive benefit and for no other purpose.
It is evident that tax-exemption is likewise to be enjoyed by the income of the pension trust. Otherwise, taxation of those earnings would result in a diminution accumulated income and reduce whatever the trust beneficiaries would receive out of the trust fund. This would run afoul of the very intendment of the law. There can be no denying either that the final withholding tax is collected from income in respect of which employees' trusts are declared exempt (Sec. 56 [b], now 53 [b], Tax Code). The application of the withholdings system to interest on bank deposits or yield from deposit substitutes is essentially to maximize and expedite the collection of income taxes by requiring its payment at the source. If an employees' trust like the GCL enjoys a tax-exempt status from income, we see no logic in withholding a certain percentage of that income which it is not supposed to pay in the first place.
(Sec. 5) Montemayor vs. Araneta, 1 L-44251, 77 SCRA 321
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?
RULING:
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a professor who after due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.
The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. It was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission, Committee that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.” Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or professional penalization on grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent, Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the chief practical requisite for academic freedom" of a university professor. As with Maclver, he did not rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as "proved incompetence or moral delinquency."
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit Catholic educational institution while respondent is a legitimate labor organization which is currently the official bargaining representative of all employees of petitioner except the faculty and consultants of the Graduate School, managerial employees and those who occupy confidential positions. Respondent has an existing CBA with petitioner for the period from June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2004. For the SY 2000-2001, petitioner increased its tuition fees for all its departments. Based on petitioner’s computation, the incremental proceeds from the tuition fees increase for SY 2000-2001 is P1,560,942.74, 85% of which is equivalent to P1,326,801.33. Consequently, respondent averred that 85% of P4,906,307.58, which is P4,170,360.59 should have been released to its members as provided for in their CBA effective June 1, 2000.
ISSUE: How should the 70%-30% tuition fee increase be allocated?
RULING:
The law allows an increase in school tuition fees on the condition that 70 percent of the increase shall go to the payment of personnel benefits. Plainly unsupported by the law or jurisprudence is petitioner’s contention that the payment of such benefits should be based not only on the rate of tuition fee increases, but also on other factors like the decrease in the number of enrollees; the number of those exempt from paying the fees, like scholars; the number of dropouts who, as such, do not pay the whole fees; and the bad debts incurred by the school. The financial dilemma of petitioner may deserve sympathy and support, but its remedy lies not in the judiciary but in the lawmaking body.
The law plainly states that 70 percent of the tuition fee increase shall be allotted for the teaching and the nonteaching personnel; and that the payment of other costs of operation, together with the improvement of the school’s infrastructure, shall be taken only from the remaining 30 percent. The law does not speak, directly or indirectly, of the contention of petitioner that in the event that its total tuition income is lesser than that in the previous year, then the whole amount of the increase in tuition fee, and not merely up to 30 percent as provided by law, may be used for the improvement and modernization of infrastructure and for the payment of other costs of operation.
(Sec. 4) CIR vs. CA , G.R. No. 95022 207 Scra 487
Petitioner, seeks a reversal of the Decision of respondent CA, dated Aug. 27, 1990, in CA-G.R. SP No. 20426, entitled "Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. GCL Retirement Plan, represented by its Trustee-Director and the Court of Tax Appeals," which affirmed the Decision of the latter Court, dated 15 December 1986, in Case No. 3888, ordering a refund, in the sum of P11,302.19, to the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income from money market placements and purchase of treasury bills, imposed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1959.
There is no dispute with respect to the facts. Private Respondent, GCL Retirement Plan (GCL, for brevity) is an employees' trust maintained by the employer, GCL Inc., to provide retirement, pension, disability and death benefits to its employees. The Plan as submitted was approved and qualified as exempt from income tax by Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue in accordance with Rep. Act No. 4917.
ISSUE: Are school’s retained earnings tax-exempt?
RULING:
Yes. GCL Plan was qualified as exempt from income tax by the CIR in accordance with Rep. Act. 4917. The tax-exemption privilege of employees' trusts, as distinguished from any other kind of property held in trust, springs from Section 56(b) (now 53[b]) of the Tax Code, “The tax imposed by this Title shall not apply to employee's trust which forms part of a pension, stock bonus or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the benefit of some or all of his employees . . .” And rightly so, by virtue of the raison de'etre behind the creation of employees' trusts. Employees' trusts or benefit plans normally provide economic assistance to employees upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, particularly, old age retirement, death, sickness, or disability. It provides security against certain hazards to which members of the Plan may be exposed. It is an independent and additional source of protection for the working group. What is more, it is established for their exclusive benefit and for no other purpose.
It is evident that tax-exemption is likewise to be enjoyed by the income of the pension trust. Otherwise, taxation of those earnings would result in a diminution accumulated income and reduce whatever the trust beneficiaries would receive out of the trust fund. This would run afoul of the very intendment of the law. There can be no denying either that the final withholding tax is collected from income in respect of which employees' trusts are declared exempt (Sec. 56 [b], now 53 [b], Tax Code). The application of the withholdings system to interest on bank deposits or yield from deposit substitutes is essentially to maximize and expedite the collection of income taxes by requiring its payment at the source. If an employees' trust like the GCL enjoys a tax-exempt status from income, we see no logic in withholding a certain percentage of that income which it is not supposed to pay in the first place.
(Sec. 5) Montemayor vs. Araneta, 1 L-44251, 77 SCRA 321
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?
RULING:
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a professor who after due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.
The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. It was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission, Committee that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.” Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or professional penalization on grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent, Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the chief practical requisite for academic freedom" of a university professor. As with Maclver, he did not rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as "proved incompetence or moral delinquency."
Comments
Post a Comment