PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES
Late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant admitted that he killed, motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.
He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 or RPC?
RULING: Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Appellant was found guilty of parricide.
PEOPLE VS MACATANDA
Saglala Macatanda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533. From the judgment of conviction, he appealed direct to this Court.
In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. the following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the barangay captain to search for the missing Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions fled, leaving him and the carabaos behind.
Appellant was taken into custody and was charged with cattle rustling. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
ISSUE: whether the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction, and (2) being a member of a cultural minority, being a Moslem, should be appreciated in his favor, which the court a quo refused to consider in the imposition of the penalty, and also disputing the correctness of the trial court's computation of the proper penalty.
RULING: Citing the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, appellant contends that his lack of instruction and education and his being a Moslem belonging to a cultural minority should mitigate his liability, and the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced accordingly. Under the circumstances of the present case, the Maqui case may not be invoked as a precedent. In the first place, in that case, the Supreme Court found indication in the record which tends to show that Maqui was an uncivilized Igorot. In the present case, owing to appellant's plea of guilty, the records discloses no evidence presented to prove the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction, which needs to be proven, as all circumstances modifying criminal liability should be proved directly and positively.
Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery leave us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle.
A legal impediment stands in the way to giving the lenient treatment appellant invokes in his appeal. It is that the records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the appellant, no evidence having been taken relative thereto because he entered a plea of guilty. 7 And the stricter treatment provided by P.D. 533 for the crime charged with a more severe penalty imposed thereon, hardly justifies the courts to apply said law with leniency.
US vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers , because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
RULING: The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances.
U.S. vs. Phelps
Internal Revenue Agent Homer C. Smith induced one James O. Phelps to look for an opium den where he could smoke opium. Smith went to Phelps three times to convince the latter of his real desire to smoke opium. Because of Smith's insistence, Phelps made efforts to look for a place where both of them could smoke this drug until he finally found one. Phelps took Smith to that place which turned out to be the house of a Chinaman and there Smith received an opium pipe and gave P2 for the service. After a while, Smith went out and returned forty minutes afterwards to arrest Phelps.
RULING: This is a clear case of inducement.
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose of making arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to the statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.
People vs. Segundino Valencia, et. al.
G.R. No. 143032, October 14, 2002
----- Entrapment vs. Instigation (Absolutory Causes)
FACTS:
SPO1 Facto and an informant pretended to wait for Johnny Tadena for them to buy drugs. When SPO1 Facto had the drugs after clear examination which he saw are white contents, he signaled his companions that the transaction had been consummated and they caught the accused.
Thus, accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca, Johnny Tadena y Torda and Domingo Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam were charged and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for violation of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, for unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0 grams of Psuedoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug. The trial court sentenced each of the accused to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of P500, 000.00.
RULING:
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. The trial court in this case correctly upheld the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It did not err in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement agents.
The ‘objective’ test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy-bust’ money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost.
People vs. Roberto Pacis
G.R. No. 146309, July 18, 2002
----- Objective Test to determine validity of buy bust
FACTS:
On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” for the amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or a total of four hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case.
In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the informant went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu.
On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the informant went to appellant’s house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings “yellow cab”. When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon returned, he gave the “boodle money” to Atty. Yap who then handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellant’s receipt of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him.
RULING:
Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by the police for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans. Bare denials by the accused cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the arresting officers’ performance of official functions.
Entrapment Distinguished from Instigation: In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.
A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not. Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
PP vs. Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
Facts: As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn’s house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he heard “sounds of romance” (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5’9” in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting “kill him Jake, kill him Jake.”
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friend’s neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.
Held: After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
PP vs. Bienvenido Nocum
Facts: About 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.
Held: The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun — for which he exhibited no license, by the way — without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)
PP vs. Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
Facts: As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn’s house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he heard “sounds of romance” (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5’9” in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting “kill him Jake, kill him Jake.”
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friend’s neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.
Held: After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
PP vs. Bienvenido Nocum
Facts: About 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.
Held: The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun — for which he exhibited no license, by the way — without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)
PP vs. Salome
Held: The case of involves a rape of a 13-year old girl (who got pregnant), committed in a dwelling and with the aid of a bladed weapon. The imposable penalty should have been death, but with the abolition of the Death Penalty, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole.
US VS VICENTILLO, 19 PHIL 118
ISSUE: FAILING TO PERFORM AN ACT REQUIRED BY LAW WHEN PREVENTED BY SOME LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE
FACTS:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Three days were expended in the detention , but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
RULING:
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
PEOPLE v Bandian
Facts: At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar, the apellant's neighbor, saw the appelant go to the thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in front and back, stagerring and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had happened to her, the appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Aguilar called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there and help him and the appellant. He asked Comcom to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemhorrage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moment before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being askes whether the babywhich was shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary dividion went to the appellant's house and found her still lying in bed still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the appellant gave birth in her house, and afterwhich, he threw the child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she was married to, because the child was not his but with another man with whom she had previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno testified that the appellant asmitted killing her child.
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admisiion to Dr. Nepomoceno that she had thrown away her newborn baby and;
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond a reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant , in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously, or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death , because her affair with a former lover, Luis Kirol took place three years before the incident. The husband of the appellant testified at the trial affirming the belief that the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable must be committed willfully and consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental facilities, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The law exmpts from criminal liability any person who acts under the circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her favor the fourth and the seventh exempting circumstances.
US v Knight
Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the defendant and appellant of reckless negligence resulting in homicide.
About 3.30 in the afternoon of the 13th of September, 1912, the defendant, a chauffeur in the employ of the quartermaster's department of the United States Army, was proceeding in charge of a heavily loaded automobile truck along Calle Isaac Peral toward the bay. Except for a steam road roller, which was slowly making its way in the same direction, in advance of the truck, the street was wholly unoccupied at that time. Just as the truck was passing the slow-moving road roller, a boy about 10 or 12 years of age jumped from the step or sideboard of the road roller directly in front of the truck, was knocked down, run over, and instantly killed.
the truck was running at the rate of about 8 miles an hour as it came up with the road roller. At a distance of about 45 or 50 feet from the road roller, the defendant sounded his horn twice and then began to turn to the right in order to pass the road roller.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of reckless negligence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized in article 568 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to one year and one day of prision correccional, to pay an indemnity in the sum of P500 to the heirs of the deceased, and to the payment of the costs.
In the absence of some exceptional circumstance, a speed of 8 miles an hour maintained by an automobile or automobile truck on a wide, obstructed, and unoccupied street, in broad daylight, cannot be said to be excessive; and the accused having sounded his horn twice before he came up with the road roller, and before he turned out in the road in the attempt to pass, must be held to have complied with the regulations in that regard.
Ruling: Based on these facts the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General that the prosecution failed to establish its charge of reckless negligence.
The conduct of the defendant was reviewed in order to determine whether or not he was recklessly negligent on the occasion when the accident occurred.
The accused in the case at bar cannot be said to have been negligent in the management of his machine, merely because he did not anticipate that the boy, 10 or 12 years of age, who was riding on the slow-moving road roller, would jump down directly in front of him at the moment when he turned his machine out into the open street in an effort to pass by. And it appearing that in all other respects he operated his machine carefully, prudently, and skillfully at the time when the accident occurred, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances, he must be acquitted of all criminal liability arising out of the unfortunate accident which resulted in the death of the boy.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the appellant should be and is hereby reversed, and he should be and is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs of both instances de oficio.
TY vs. People
Facts: Ty’s mother was confined in Manila Doctor's Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to 600,000 pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal actions against Ty for violation of BP22.
In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. She further claimed that no consideration was obtained by her because all the checks were made as payment to the medical bills.
Issue: Whether or not valuable consideration exists.
Held: Under Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that valuable consideration exist upon the issuance of a check in the absence of evidence to the contrary.Valuable consideration is any benefit, interest or profit accruing to the party. The use of the hospital facilities and services may be deemed as such.
People vs Rogado
Facts
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying with him a bolo on lots scabbard to gather firewood in his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return home that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was accompanied by some armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health officer, and after a brief search, they found the decapitated body of her husband in an uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer away from the road. The gruesome find revealed that Areza's head was totally severed from his body with his hands tied together. The health officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in state of decomposition, which led him to conclude that the deceased must have died three to five days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and his scabbard were also found near his body.
It was reported to Rogado who asked him to lead the way and Areza refused saying that he had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao.Rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza and that if he should refuse, he should be tied, which instruction Racoma relayed to his two companions, Merin and arsenal, telling them to be prepared in case Areza would give them a fight.
Racoma approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo. Areza obliged. When Areza refused to go with them, Pio Mercurio dragged him along, and as he refused, Golfeo struck him with the butt of his gun.
after walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind him. Areza protested, whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach. After walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they stopped. Racoma then approached Rogado to release Areza at night but rogado told him that Areza should be killed. Racoma returned to the group and he found that Areza was being assaulted by Orenia and Golfeo. Racoma heard Rogado saying, in the vernacular, "Kill him now so we can proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded about 20 or 30 meters away, and there Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With Areza's bolo and ignoring the plea for mercy of their victim, Golfeo gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and with his hands still tied behind. With the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim another blow on the neck which completely severed the head from the body.
Issue: an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury
Both Domingo Golfeo and Cresencio Arsenal, while admitting their participation in the killing of the deceased, claimed in exculpation that they acted under the pressure of an irresistible force in that they merely obeyed the order of their Commander, Rogado alias Commander Sulit, who would have killed them if they disobeyed his order. he defense of Golfeo is clearly untenable not only because of the well-settled rule that obedience to an order of a superior will only justify an act which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for a lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which Golfeo participated in the torture and liquidation of Areza cannot in any way justify his claim that he acted under an uncontrollable fear of being punished by his superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the first place, at the time of the killing, Golfeo was armed with automatic carbine such that he could have protected himself from any retaliation on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza. In the second place, the evidence shows that Areza was brought to a secluded place quite far from that where his superiors were at the time and in such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have escaped with Areza to void the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried out their order although his superiors were at some distance from him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in a Kempetai fashion show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily or under the pressure of fear of force, as he claims, but out of his own free will and with the desire to collaborate with the criminal design of his superiors. In the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in finding him responsible for the death of Areza as co-principal by direct participation. Same situation obtained with regard to Cresencio Arsenal. rsenal took the bolo himself and gave the fatal blow which completely severed the head of Areza from his body. There is therefore no doubt that Arsenal directly cooperated with Golfeo in carrying out the concerted plan of killing Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the help they demanded from him.
People vs Galacgac
Facts: On November 22, 1951, as a consequence of a shooting and beating spree which occurred in Sta. Cruz, Manila, Enrique Galacgac, a naturalized American Citizen and Paulino Galacgac were accussed of attempted paricide with physical serious injuries in Criminal Case NO. 19292 however after trial Paulino Galacgac was acquitted. Enrique Galacgac was also charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case 19293, with two separate charges of attempted homicide, Criminal Case 19294 and 19295, and with illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case No.19296 however, likewise after trial was acquitted from the Criminal Case 19293 and 19294 but convicted for Criminal Case 19292, 19295 and 19296. And Pablo Soriano was accused of frustrated homicide in Criminal case 19297.
For the Criminal Case 19292, serious physical injuries; Criminal Case 19295, attempted homicide and Criminal Case 19296, illegal possession of firearms he was sentenced to suffer respectively, four months of arresto mayor, an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of prision correctional and an imprisonment of one year and one day. As for Pablo Soriano who was found guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of prision correctional and to pay the cost except for criminal case 19292, Enrique was ordered to pay one-half of the cost. Not satisfied Enrique and Soriano appealed the judgments.
On appeal, Galacgac claimed that the firearm was a homecoming present for his wife and that he arrived at 3:00pm in Manila however the Phil Constabulary closes at 4:00pm and therefore he failed to secure a license for the firearm. Likewise, he claimed that being an American Citizen he couldn’t be prosecuted and likewise convicted of illegal possession of firearm since in the United States it is a constitutional right “to keep and bear arms.”
The indiscriminate shooting which resulted to the injury of Marina Ramos and Alfonso Ramos was brought about by the hitting of Pablo Soriano with an iron bar on the forehead of Enrique twice causing blood to profusely ooze from his head and thus making him dizzy and dimming his vision, when the latter interfered in a marital argument.
Issue: Crime by mere accident
RULING:SC MODIFIED the judgment of the lower court, Enrique Galacgac was sentenced to suffer ten days of arresto manor and pay one-half of the cost of Criminal Case 19292; undergo same number of days of arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case 19295; and an indeterminate imprisonment of from one year to two years and six months, and to pay the cost for Criminal Case 19296. As for Pablo Soriano, he is sentenced to suffer fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case 19297.
With regards to Enrique Galacgac’s claim that he is exempt from prosecution being and American Citizen and an employee of the U.S. Navy. SC holds that a mere civilian of the U.S. Navy is not entitled to any extra –territorial privilege for, strictly speaking, he is not a member of the armed forces of the United States Army.
With regards to the illegal possession of firearms, based on sec.892 of the Revised Administrative Code, ordains that any person, whether a national or foreigner, coming to the Philippines and bringing with him any firearm, must deposit the same with the Collector of Customs who in turn must deliver it to the Phil Constabulary, from which the firearm cannot be taken until the importer shall have secured a license to possess it.
With regards to Pablo Soriano’s claim that he acted in defense of Concepcion, his testimony was belied by Concepcion Ramos and Mauricio Ramos proving that Soriano did not act in defense of his person and his family
PP vs MACATANDA, G.R. No. L-51368 November 6, 1981
Facts:In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. the following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the barangay captain to search for the missing Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions fled, leaving him and the carabaos behind.
The amount of One Hundred Fifty (P150.00) Pesos is hereby ordered paid to Atty. Reynaldo Echavez for his services as counsel de oficio .
Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle rustling, Saglala Macatanda was sentenced as follows:
Saglala Macatanda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533 and as described in the information filed against him. Crediting in his favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and extreme poverty without any attendant aggravating circumstances, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum .
The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Issue : No Mc or Ac
Ruling: P.D. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, entitles appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporary medium.
Appellant's computation would be to lower the aforesaid penalty to prision correccional maximum, to prision mayor, medium period, in view of the presence of the two mitigating circumstances as appreciated by the court a quo, with no aggravating circumstance attendant. For the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should be one degree lower still, or arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision correccional in its medium period, or from 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, and not less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range, as to its maximum period, but is beyond the range, as to its minimum period, which should be not more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to 4 years of prision correccional and maintaining the maximum at 8 years of prision mayor as imposed by the lower court. With the modification as indicated, the appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects.
Late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant admitted that he killed, motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.
He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 or RPC?
RULING: Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Appellant was found guilty of parricide.
PEOPLE VS MACATANDA
Saglala Macatanda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533. From the judgment of conviction, he appealed direct to this Court.
In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. the following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the barangay captain to search for the missing Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions fled, leaving him and the carabaos behind.
Appellant was taken into custody and was charged with cattle rustling. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
ISSUE: whether the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction, and (2) being a member of a cultural minority, being a Moslem, should be appreciated in his favor, which the court a quo refused to consider in the imposition of the penalty, and also disputing the correctness of the trial court's computation of the proper penalty.
RULING: Citing the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, appellant contends that his lack of instruction and education and his being a Moslem belonging to a cultural minority should mitigate his liability, and the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced accordingly. Under the circumstances of the present case, the Maqui case may not be invoked as a precedent. In the first place, in that case, the Supreme Court found indication in the record which tends to show that Maqui was an uncivilized Igorot. In the present case, owing to appellant's plea of guilty, the records discloses no evidence presented to prove the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction, which needs to be proven, as all circumstances modifying criminal liability should be proved directly and positively.
Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery leave us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle.
A legal impediment stands in the way to giving the lenient treatment appellant invokes in his appeal. It is that the records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the appellant, no evidence having been taken relative thereto because he entered a plea of guilty. 7 And the stricter treatment provided by P.D. 533 for the crime charged with a more severe penalty imposed thereon, hardly justifies the courts to apply said law with leniency.
US vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers , because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
RULING: The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances.
U.S. vs. Phelps
Internal Revenue Agent Homer C. Smith induced one James O. Phelps to look for an opium den where he could smoke opium. Smith went to Phelps three times to convince the latter of his real desire to smoke opium. Because of Smith's insistence, Phelps made efforts to look for a place where both of them could smoke this drug until he finally found one. Phelps took Smith to that place which turned out to be the house of a Chinaman and there Smith received an opium pipe and gave P2 for the service. After a while, Smith went out and returned forty minutes afterwards to arrest Phelps.
RULING: This is a clear case of inducement.
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose of making arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to the statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.
People vs. Segundino Valencia, et. al.
G.R. No. 143032, October 14, 2002
----- Entrapment vs. Instigation (Absolutory Causes)
FACTS:
SPO1 Facto and an informant pretended to wait for Johnny Tadena for them to buy drugs. When SPO1 Facto had the drugs after clear examination which he saw are white contents, he signaled his companions that the transaction had been consummated and they caught the accused.
Thus, accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca, Johnny Tadena y Torda and Domingo Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam were charged and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for violation of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, for unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0 grams of Psuedoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug. The trial court sentenced each of the accused to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of P500, 000.00.
RULING:
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. The trial court in this case correctly upheld the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It did not err in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement agents.
The ‘objective’ test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy-bust’ money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost.
People vs. Roberto Pacis
G.R. No. 146309, July 18, 2002
----- Objective Test to determine validity of buy bust
FACTS:
On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” for the amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or a total of four hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case.
In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the informant went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu.
On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the informant went to appellant’s house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings “yellow cab”. When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon returned, he gave the “boodle money” to Atty. Yap who then handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellant’s receipt of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him.
RULING:
Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by the police for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans. Bare denials by the accused cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the arresting officers’ performance of official functions.
Entrapment Distinguished from Instigation: In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.
A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not. Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
PP vs. Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
Facts: As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn’s house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he heard “sounds of romance” (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5’9” in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting “kill him Jake, kill him Jake.”
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friend’s neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.
Held: After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
PP vs. Bienvenido Nocum
Facts: About 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.
Held: The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun — for which he exhibited no license, by the way — without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)
PP vs. Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
Facts: As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn’s house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he heard “sounds of romance” (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5’9” in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting “kill him Jake, kill him Jake.”
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friend’s neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.
Held: After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
PP vs. Bienvenido Nocum
Facts: About 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.
Held: The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun — for which he exhibited no license, by the way — without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)
PP vs. Salome
Held: The case of involves a rape of a 13-year old girl (who got pregnant), committed in a dwelling and with the aid of a bladed weapon. The imposable penalty should have been death, but with the abolition of the Death Penalty, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole.
US VS VICENTILLO, 19 PHIL 118
ISSUE: FAILING TO PERFORM AN ACT REQUIRED BY LAW WHEN PREVENTED BY SOME LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE
FACTS:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Three days were expended in the detention , but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
RULING:
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
PEOPLE v Bandian
Facts: At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar, the apellant's neighbor, saw the appelant go to the thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in front and back, stagerring and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had happened to her, the appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Aguilar called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there and help him and the appellant. He asked Comcom to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemhorrage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moment before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being askes whether the babywhich was shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary dividion went to the appellant's house and found her still lying in bed still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the appellant gave birth in her house, and afterwhich, he threw the child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she was married to, because the child was not his but with another man with whom she had previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno testified that the appellant asmitted killing her child.
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admisiion to Dr. Nepomoceno that she had thrown away her newborn baby and;
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond a reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant , in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously, or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death , because her affair with a former lover, Luis Kirol took place three years before the incident. The husband of the appellant testified at the trial affirming the belief that the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable must be committed willfully and consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental facilities, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The law exmpts from criminal liability any person who acts under the circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her favor the fourth and the seventh exempting circumstances.
US v Knight
Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the defendant and appellant of reckless negligence resulting in homicide.
About 3.30 in the afternoon of the 13th of September, 1912, the defendant, a chauffeur in the employ of the quartermaster's department of the United States Army, was proceeding in charge of a heavily loaded automobile truck along Calle Isaac Peral toward the bay. Except for a steam road roller, which was slowly making its way in the same direction, in advance of the truck, the street was wholly unoccupied at that time. Just as the truck was passing the slow-moving road roller, a boy about 10 or 12 years of age jumped from the step or sideboard of the road roller directly in front of the truck, was knocked down, run over, and instantly killed.
the truck was running at the rate of about 8 miles an hour as it came up with the road roller. At a distance of about 45 or 50 feet from the road roller, the defendant sounded his horn twice and then began to turn to the right in order to pass the road roller.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of reckless negligence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized in article 568 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to one year and one day of prision correccional, to pay an indemnity in the sum of P500 to the heirs of the deceased, and to the payment of the costs.
In the absence of some exceptional circumstance, a speed of 8 miles an hour maintained by an automobile or automobile truck on a wide, obstructed, and unoccupied street, in broad daylight, cannot be said to be excessive; and the accused having sounded his horn twice before he came up with the road roller, and before he turned out in the road in the attempt to pass, must be held to have complied with the regulations in that regard.
Ruling: Based on these facts the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General that the prosecution failed to establish its charge of reckless negligence.
The conduct of the defendant was reviewed in order to determine whether or not he was recklessly negligent on the occasion when the accident occurred.
The accused in the case at bar cannot be said to have been negligent in the management of his machine, merely because he did not anticipate that the boy, 10 or 12 years of age, who was riding on the slow-moving road roller, would jump down directly in front of him at the moment when he turned his machine out into the open street in an effort to pass by. And it appearing that in all other respects he operated his machine carefully, prudently, and skillfully at the time when the accident occurred, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances, he must be acquitted of all criminal liability arising out of the unfortunate accident which resulted in the death of the boy.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the appellant should be and is hereby reversed, and he should be and is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs of both instances de oficio.
TY vs. People
Facts: Ty’s mother was confined in Manila Doctor's Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to 600,000 pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal actions against Ty for violation of BP22.
In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. She further claimed that no consideration was obtained by her because all the checks were made as payment to the medical bills.
Issue: Whether or not valuable consideration exists.
Held: Under Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that valuable consideration exist upon the issuance of a check in the absence of evidence to the contrary.Valuable consideration is any benefit, interest or profit accruing to the party. The use of the hospital facilities and services may be deemed as such.
People vs Rogado
Facts
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying with him a bolo on lots scabbard to gather firewood in his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return home that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was accompanied by some armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health officer, and after a brief search, they found the decapitated body of her husband in an uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer away from the road. The gruesome find revealed that Areza's head was totally severed from his body with his hands tied together. The health officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in state of decomposition, which led him to conclude that the deceased must have died three to five days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and his scabbard were also found near his body.
It was reported to Rogado who asked him to lead the way and Areza refused saying that he had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao.Rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza and that if he should refuse, he should be tied, which instruction Racoma relayed to his two companions, Merin and arsenal, telling them to be prepared in case Areza would give them a fight.
Racoma approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo. Areza obliged. When Areza refused to go with them, Pio Mercurio dragged him along, and as he refused, Golfeo struck him with the butt of his gun.
after walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind him. Areza protested, whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach. After walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they stopped. Racoma then approached Rogado to release Areza at night but rogado told him that Areza should be killed. Racoma returned to the group and he found that Areza was being assaulted by Orenia and Golfeo. Racoma heard Rogado saying, in the vernacular, "Kill him now so we can proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded about 20 or 30 meters away, and there Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With Areza's bolo and ignoring the plea for mercy of their victim, Golfeo gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and with his hands still tied behind. With the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim another blow on the neck which completely severed the head from the body.
Issue: an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury
Both Domingo Golfeo and Cresencio Arsenal, while admitting their participation in the killing of the deceased, claimed in exculpation that they acted under the pressure of an irresistible force in that they merely obeyed the order of their Commander, Rogado alias Commander Sulit, who would have killed them if they disobeyed his order. he defense of Golfeo is clearly untenable not only because of the well-settled rule that obedience to an order of a superior will only justify an act which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for a lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which Golfeo participated in the torture and liquidation of Areza cannot in any way justify his claim that he acted under an uncontrollable fear of being punished by his superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the first place, at the time of the killing, Golfeo was armed with automatic carbine such that he could have protected himself from any retaliation on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza. In the second place, the evidence shows that Areza was brought to a secluded place quite far from that where his superiors were at the time and in such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have escaped with Areza to void the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried out their order although his superiors were at some distance from him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in a Kempetai fashion show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily or under the pressure of fear of force, as he claims, but out of his own free will and with the desire to collaborate with the criminal design of his superiors. In the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in finding him responsible for the death of Areza as co-principal by direct participation. Same situation obtained with regard to Cresencio Arsenal. rsenal took the bolo himself and gave the fatal blow which completely severed the head of Areza from his body. There is therefore no doubt that Arsenal directly cooperated with Golfeo in carrying out the concerted plan of killing Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the help they demanded from him.
People vs Galacgac
Facts: On November 22, 1951, as a consequence of a shooting and beating spree which occurred in Sta. Cruz, Manila, Enrique Galacgac, a naturalized American Citizen and Paulino Galacgac were accussed of attempted paricide with physical serious injuries in Criminal Case NO. 19292 however after trial Paulino Galacgac was acquitted. Enrique Galacgac was also charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case 19293, with two separate charges of attempted homicide, Criminal Case 19294 and 19295, and with illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case No.19296 however, likewise after trial was acquitted from the Criminal Case 19293 and 19294 but convicted for Criminal Case 19292, 19295 and 19296. And Pablo Soriano was accused of frustrated homicide in Criminal case 19297.
For the Criminal Case 19292, serious physical injuries; Criminal Case 19295, attempted homicide and Criminal Case 19296, illegal possession of firearms he was sentenced to suffer respectively, four months of arresto mayor, an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of prision correctional and an imprisonment of one year and one day. As for Pablo Soriano who was found guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of prision correctional and to pay the cost except for criminal case 19292, Enrique was ordered to pay one-half of the cost. Not satisfied Enrique and Soriano appealed the judgments.
On appeal, Galacgac claimed that the firearm was a homecoming present for his wife and that he arrived at 3:00pm in Manila however the Phil Constabulary closes at 4:00pm and therefore he failed to secure a license for the firearm. Likewise, he claimed that being an American Citizen he couldn’t be prosecuted and likewise convicted of illegal possession of firearm since in the United States it is a constitutional right “to keep and bear arms.”
The indiscriminate shooting which resulted to the injury of Marina Ramos and Alfonso Ramos was brought about by the hitting of Pablo Soriano with an iron bar on the forehead of Enrique twice causing blood to profusely ooze from his head and thus making him dizzy and dimming his vision, when the latter interfered in a marital argument.
Issue: Crime by mere accident
RULING:SC MODIFIED the judgment of the lower court, Enrique Galacgac was sentenced to suffer ten days of arresto manor and pay one-half of the cost of Criminal Case 19292; undergo same number of days of arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case 19295; and an indeterminate imprisonment of from one year to two years and six months, and to pay the cost for Criminal Case 19296. As for Pablo Soriano, he is sentenced to suffer fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case 19297.
With regards to Enrique Galacgac’s claim that he is exempt from prosecution being and American Citizen and an employee of the U.S. Navy. SC holds that a mere civilian of the U.S. Navy is not entitled to any extra –territorial privilege for, strictly speaking, he is not a member of the armed forces of the United States Army.
With regards to the illegal possession of firearms, based on sec.892 of the Revised Administrative Code, ordains that any person, whether a national or foreigner, coming to the Philippines and bringing with him any firearm, must deposit the same with the Collector of Customs who in turn must deliver it to the Phil Constabulary, from which the firearm cannot be taken until the importer shall have secured a license to possess it.
With regards to Pablo Soriano’s claim that he acted in defense of Concepcion, his testimony was belied by Concepcion Ramos and Mauricio Ramos proving that Soriano did not act in defense of his person and his family
PP vs MACATANDA, G.R. No. L-51368 November 6, 1981
Facts:In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. the following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the barangay captain to search for the missing Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions fled, leaving him and the carabaos behind.
The amount of One Hundred Fifty (P150.00) Pesos is hereby ordered paid to Atty. Reynaldo Echavez for his services as counsel de oficio .
Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle rustling, Saglala Macatanda was sentenced as follows:
Saglala Macatanda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533 and as described in the information filed against him. Crediting in his favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and extreme poverty without any attendant aggravating circumstances, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum .
The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Issue : No Mc or Ac
Ruling: P.D. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, entitles appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporary medium.
Appellant's computation would be to lower the aforesaid penalty to prision correccional maximum, to prision mayor, medium period, in view of the presence of the two mitigating circumstances as appreciated by the court a quo, with no aggravating circumstance attendant. For the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should be one degree lower still, or arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision correccional in its medium period, or from 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, and not less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range, as to its maximum period, but is beyond the range, as to its minimum period, which should be not more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to 4 years of prision correccional and maintaining the maximum at 8 years of prision mayor as imposed by the lower court. With the modification as indicated, the appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects.
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