Casimero vs Rembrant Hotel, GR 159647, Apr 14, 2005
Respondent Stern Real Estate & Development Corporation is a corporation engaged in the business of purchasing, selling and operating buildings and other real properties for profit. One such property it owns is the Hotel Rembrandt.
The respondent hotel undertook a Special Separation Program (SSP) which all employees can avail of for the limited period, due to the dire financial status it was experiencing. Forty-nine (49) employees were accepted for this separation program. The private respondents then decided that a retrenchment program was further needed in order to stem the losses. The private respondents then informed the DOLE through an Establishment Termination Report, that they were retrenching twenty-nine (29) employees. The private respondents likewise informed these twenty-nine (29) employees that their services would be terminated thirty (30) days after the receipt of the written notification. After one month from receipt of the letters of termination, the twenty-nine (29) employees were given their separation pay and the corresponding quitclaims were signed.
Petitioners were among the retrenched employees. They later filed a complaint for "illegal dismissal in the guise of retrenchment and underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay, premium compensation for holiday and rest day" with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Issue: Will retrenchment, on account of economic loss, be justified on the face of constitutional pro-labor mandate?
Ruling: Article 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes retrenchment as one of the valid causes to dismiss employees as a measure to avoid or minimize business losses. Retrenchment is the "termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation." Simply put, it is a reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to minimize losses incurred in the operation of its business. It is a management prerogative consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court.
We enumerated the requirements for a valid retrenchment which the employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) that the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) that the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and (5) that the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.
Phil-employ Services vs Rodriguez , GR 152616 , Mar 31, 2006
Anita Rodriguez applied with Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. Anita was hired and deployed for Taiwan as a domestic helper for a one-year contract with principal Chao Hung Ching in Taiwan with a monthly salary of NT$14,010.00. It was agreed that she would undergo a forty (40) days probationary period before she becomes a regular domestic helper.
During the first ten (10) days of her probationary period, respondent was observed to be inattentive and incompetent to perform her duties and responsibilities. She could not cook and do simple things as washing clothes. It was the principal’s mother-in-law who did most of the household chores, like babysitting of the child. Respondent kept insisting that she be allowed to go home on account of her incapability to perform her job. After the first ten (10) days’ work with the principal employer, complainant returned to the Philippines.
Issue: Is prior notice required in terminating a domestic helper?
Ruling: Yes. Even if it were true that Anita’s foreign employer terminated her services after 10 days of her employment, there could be no illegal dismissal as the termination was effected during the agreed probationary period. The law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute would automatically be decided in favor of labor.
However, although Anita’s employment was terminated because she failed to meet the standards of her foreign employer, still it is necessary and obligatory to afford Anita her basic right to notice. Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Security of tenure. (a) In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized causes as provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due process.
(b) The foregoing shall also apply in cases of probationary employment; provided, however, that in such cases, termination of employment due to failure of the employee to qualify in accordance with the standards of the employer made known to the former at the time of engagement may also be a ground for termination of employment.
Yrasuegui vs PAL, GR 168081, Oct. 17, 2008
Facts: On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
Issue: Will obesity justify employment termination? What is the Meiorin Test? Is it valid and constitutional?
Ruling: A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) - the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."
In British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employee's Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."
Fuentes vs Caguimbal, GR 150305, Nov 22, 2007
Facts: Honofre Fuentes is the owner of the property being claimed in this case. Said property is located in Calatagan, Batangas. On January 18, 2000, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Felomino Caguimbal with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batangas, alleging that in 1991, he allowed respondent to occupy the property rent-free, subject to the condition that the latter will vacate the property when petitioner returns from abroad. However, upon his return, respondent refused to vacate the property, forcing petitioner to file the case. Respondent denied petitioner's allegations, claiming that his father started occupying the property in 1928 as agricultural tenant until his disability in 1976, after which he (respondent) took over.
Issue: Can tenancy be presumed?
Held: No. Section 3 of R.A. No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines defines agricultural tenancy as "the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by another, for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both." The essential requisites of tenancy are: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties; (4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved.Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and the private respondents.
What was established by the evidence in the present case was that respondent and his predecessor had been planting on the property since 1928. What is wanting, however, is proof showing the sharing of harvests or that petitioner, as landowner of the subject property ever gave his consent to establish or maintain a tenancy relationship.
Tano versus Socrates
G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997
Facts: Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. One of the contentions in this case is that:
The Ordinances: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23 and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Is the preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources absolute?
Ruling: The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.” Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.
DE CASTRO HOMESITE, INC. vs. HON. EMILIO L. LEACHON
G.R. No. 124856 March 10, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner De Castro Homesite, Inc., a duly organized corporation and the owner of twelve (12) parcels of residential land in Quezon City, known as the Dupax Compound, filed a complaint against private respondents for violation of Pres. Decree No. 772.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that Pres. Decree No. 772 is unconstitutional. Said Motion was denied by the MeTC which stated that said law has not yet been declared unconstitutional by the proper tribunal. A Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.
The controversies arising from this case center on the question of the constitutionality and legality of Pres. Decree No. 772 vis-Ã -vis the adoption of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of Rep. Act No. 7279.
ISSUE: What are professional Squatters?
RULING: Article I, Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7279 defines "professional squatters" as individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term shall also apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelot or housing units by the Government but who sold, leased, transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing.
KMG vs CAO , GR 150769, Aug. 31, 2004
Facts: On January 25, 1993, the Secretary of Health wrote Dr. Orlando C. Misa, Vice President and Medical Director of the GSIS, that the Medical Services Group personnel of the GSIS were public health workers under R.A. No. 7305. However, in a letter dated January 17, 1994 written in response to a query from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) whether personnel of the Medical Department of the GSIS and the Social Security System can avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 7305, the Secretary of Health stated that the said personnel cannot be classified as public health workers until their respective agencies have been considered as health-related establishments as defined in the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7305. On June 9, 1999, GSIS Resident Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance regarding the payment of allowances under R.A. No. 7305 for January 1998 to the SIG personnel. The retroactive disallowance was made in accordance with a letter dated May 5, 1999 from the DBM stating that employees belonging to the SIG are not considered as "health-related workers" and are therefore not qualified to receive hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305. On October 29, 1999, GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, on behalf of the employees in the SIG, requested for the reconsideration of Notice of Disallowance. However, Dimagiba maintained that the disallowance was proper. The KMG, the recognized employees' union in the GSIS, appealed the disallowance of allowances under R.A. No. 7305 to the SIG personnel to the COA. However, on May 10, 2001, the COA rendered Decision No. 2001-068 affirming the disallowance of allowances for the SIG personnel. The KMG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but on November 13, 2001, the COA issued its Resolution denying the KMG's motion for reconsideration.
Issue: What does the “Magna Carta” for health workers intend to achieve
Held: R.A. No. 7305, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers," was enacted by Congress on January 28, 1992. Signed into law by then President Corazon C. Aquino on March 26, 1992, it took effect on April 17, 1992. The law aims to promote and improve the economic and social well-being as well as the living and working conditions of health workers in the public sector; to develop their skills and capabilities to make them more responsive and better equipped to deliver health projects and programs; and to attract the best and the brightest health workers to join and remain in government service. Accordingly, in addition to the basic salary of public health workers, the law provides for hazard pay, subsistence, longevity pay, laundry and remote assignment allowances for them. The GSIS, as the administrator of the funds for the pension and retirement funds of government employees, is obviously not a health or health-related establishment. Therefore, it must be established that the SIG is an office in the GSIS rendering health or health-related services for the SIG personnel to qualify as public health workers under R.A. No. 7305.
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the inescapable conclusion is that a mere incidental or slight connection between the employee's work and the delivery of health or health-related services is not sufficient to make a government employee a public health worker within the meaning of R.A. 7305. The employee must be principally engaged in the delivery of health or health-related services to be deemed a public health worker.
Philhealth vs. Chinese Gen. Hospital
G.R. No. 163123, April 15, 2005
FACTS:
Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875, otherwise known as “An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation for the Purpose,” Chinese General Hospital (CGH) had been an accredited health care provider under the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare.
CGH filed its Medicare claims which PHILHEALTH, successor of the PMCC, only gave P 1, 365, 556.32 instead of P 8, 102, 782.10 for years 1989 to 1992. CGH again filed its claims for years 1998 to 1999, amounting to P 7, 554, 342.93 but was denied for being allegedly filed beyond the 60 day period allowed by the implementing rules and regulations. Thus, upon the review of the court, petitioner Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) to pay the claims in the amount of P 14, 291, 568.71, principally on the ground of liberal application of the 60-day rule under Section 52 of RA 7875’s Implementing Rules and Regulations.
ISSUES:
What state policy is RA 7875 pursuing? In case of conflict between RA 7875 and Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which one shall prevail?
RULING:
The state policy adopted in RA 7875 sought to: a) provide all citizens of the Philippines with the mechanism to gain financial access to health services; b) create the National Health Insurance Program to serve as the means to help the people pay for the health services; c)prioritize and accelerate the provision of health services to all Filipinos, especially that segment of the population who cannot afford such services; and d) establish the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation that will administer the program at central and local levels.
The court ruled that RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not provide for any specific period within which to file claims. It can safely be presumed that the period for filing was not per se the principal concern of the legislature. The fact is that it was not RA 7875 itself but Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations which established the 60-day cut-off for the filing of claims.
While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law, these issuances are by no means iron-clad norms. Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact “bent the rules” for reasons of public interest. Thus, RA 7875 prevails over Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
GR 166676 , Sept. 12, 2008
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision dated Jan.12, 2005 of the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name “Jennifer Cagandahan” changed to “Jeff Cagandahan” and (2) gender from “female” to “male.” In her petition, she alleged that she was born on Jan. 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
ISSUE: Is a change in sex gender consistent to the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health?
RULING: In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol
GR 164774, Apr. 12, 2006
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees.
ISSUE: Is a corporate policy banning spouses from working in the same company, constitutional?
RULING:
No. The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Labor; Right to Strike (1993)
No. 15: Congressman Cheng says he is one of the co-authors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Charter. He declares that the SBMA is the answer to rapid economic growth and the attainment of the President's Philippine 2000" dream. However, Cheng is worried that foreign capital might be slow in coming in due to unstable working conditions resulting from too many strikes. To remedy this situation. Cheng proposes an amendment to SBMA law declaring it as a strike-free zone or total ban on strikes. Is this proposal legally defensible? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Art. XIII. sec. 3 of the Constitution guarantees the right of all workers to engage in peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. Thus, a law cannot totally prohibit the right to strike but can only regulate the exercise thereof. His proposal to ban strikes totally in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone is, therefore unconstitutional.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
While the Constitution guarantees to workers the right to engage in peaceful concerted activities, Including the right to strike, such right can only be exercised in accordance with law. The phrase "in accordance with law" was Inserted precisely to Indicate that in some exceptional cases workers would not have the right to strike if it is prohibited by law. Hence, the proposal to ban strikes totally in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone is constitutional. (Social Security System Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, July 28. 1989; Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)).
Exploration and Development of Minerals (1994)
No. 11: In the desire to improve the fishing methods of the fishermen, the Bureau of Fisheries, with the approval of the President, entered into a memorandum of agreement to allow Thai fishermen to fish within 200 miles from the Philippine sea coasts on the condition that Filipino fishermen be allowed to use Thai fishing equipment and vessels, and to learn modern technology in fishing and canning.
1) Is the agreement valid?
2) Suppose the agreement is for a joint venture on the same area with a Thai oil corporation for the exploration and exploitation of minerals with the Thai corporation providing technical and financial assistance. Is the agreement valid?
ANSWER;
1) No. Only Filipinos may fish in exclusive economic zone...
2) The President can enter into a memorandum of agreement with a Thai oil
corporation involving technical and financial assistance for the exploration and exploitation of minerals, but there should be no Joint venture. Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution authorizes the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for the exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. However, the same provision states the joint venture for the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken only with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per cent of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizen.
2007 BAR
The City Mayor issues an Executive Order declaring
that the city promotes responsible parenthood and upholds
natural family planning. He prohibits all hospitals operated by
the city from prescribing the use of artificial methods of
contraception, including condoms, pills, intrauterine devices
and surgical sterilization. As a result, poor women in his city
lost their access to affordable family planning programs.
Private clinics, however, continue to render family planning
counsel and devices to paying clients.
(a) Is the Executive Order in any way constitutionally
infirm? Explain.
(b) Is the Philippines in breach of any obligation under
international law? Explain.
(c) May the Commission on Human Rights order the Mayor
to stop the implementation of the Executive Order?
Explain.
1. Yes, the executive order is constitutionally infirm. For purposes of executing a law, no ordinance, order or whatever form of sub-legislation should limit or exceed whatever is provided under any law or acts of congress. Otherwise it will be contrary to the time-honored rule of "potestas delagata delegari non potest"-whatever is delegated cannot be further delegated.
In the instant case, the Mayor thru an executive order denied his constituents particularly the women to adopt any lawful method or means of family planning, which is accorded to them by a statute. The executive order, ergo, defeated the purpose of the law instead of giving life to it. Premises considered, the act of the mayor is unconstitutional.
2. No, the act of the mayor should not affect the validity of a statute the congress has enacted in order that the Philippines will cope up with its treaty obligations (Rights of women). The statute is per se legal and in consonance with the treaty which the Philippines is a signatory.
3. No, since the executive order is invalid and unconstitutional, the proper remedy is an action for a declaratory relief which must be poperly lodged before the courts and not the Commission on Human Rights.
State Principles & Policies (1994)
No. 1; What is the state policy on: a) working women?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Section 14, Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The State shall protect WORKING WOMEN by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation."
Judicial Department; Writ of Amparo (1991)
No 1: What is a Constitutional writ of Amparo and what is the basis for such a remedy under the Constitution?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The writ of Amparo in Mexican law is an extraordinary remedy whereby an interested party may seek the invalidation of any executive, legislative or judicial act deemed in violation of a fundamental right. The adoption of such a remedy in the Philippines may be based on Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution, which empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Commission on Human Rights; Power to issue TRO (1997)
No. 8 - About a hundred people occupied a parcel of land in Quezon City belonging to the city government and built shanties thereon which they utilized for dwelling, sari-sari stores, etc. The City Mayor issued an order directing
the occupants to vacate the structures within five days from notice, otherwise they would be evicted and relocated and their shanties removed, in order that the parcel of land could be converted into a park for public use and enjoyment. The inhabitants of the parcel of land complained to the Commission on Human Rights urging that the Mayor of Quezon City be stopped from doing what he has threatened to do. The Commission on Human Rights, after conducting an investigation and finding that the shanties of petitioners were already being demolished by then, ordered the Quezon City Mayor and persons Implementing his order to cease and desist from demolishing petitioners' shanties under pain of contempt.
What have you to say on the validity of the actuation of the Commission on Human Rights in relation to that of the Quezon City Mayor?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The actuation of the Commission on Human Rights is void. In Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117. the Court held that the Commission on Human Rights has no power to issue a restraining order or a writ of injunction and has no power to cite for contempt for violation of the restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. The cease and desist order, according to the Court, is a semantic Interplay for a restraining order. Its power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers, which it is constitutionally authorized to adopt.
Commission on Human Rights; Power to issue TRO (2001) No
VI - In order to implement a big government flood control project, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and a local government unit (LGU) removed squatters from the bank of a river and certain esteros for relocation to another place. Their shanties were demolished. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) conducted an investigation and issued an order for the DPWH and the LGU to cease and desist from effecting the removal of the squatters on the ground that the human rights of the squatters were being violated. The DPWH and the LGU objected to the order of the CHR Resolve which position is correct. Reasons (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER; The position of the Department of Public Works and Highways and of the local government unit is correct. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA125 (1992), no provision in the Constitution or any law confers on the Commission on Human Rights jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. The Commission on Human Rights has no judicial power. Its powers are merely investigatory.
Commission on Human Rights; Power; Limitations (Q4-2005)
(2) Squatters and vendors have put up structures in an area intended for a People's Park, which are impeding the flow of traffic in the adjoining highway. Mayor Cruz gave notice for the structures to be removed, and the area vacated within a month, or else, face demolition and ejectment. The occupants filed a case with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to stop the Mayor's move. The CHR then issued an "order to desist" against Mayor Cruz with warning that he would be held in contempt should he fail to comply with the desistance order. When the allotted time lapsed, Mayor Cruz caused the demolition and removal of the structures. Accordingly, the CHR cited him for contempt. (5%)
(a) What is your concept of Human Rights? Does this case involve violations of human rights within the scope of the CHR's jurisdiction? SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the scope of human rights includes "those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations... along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life." In the case at bar, the land adjoins a busy national highway and the construction of the squatter shanties impedes the flow of traffic. The consequent danger to life and limb cannot be ignored. It is paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Based on the circumstances obtaining in this instance, the CHR order for demolition do not fall within the compartment of human rights violations involving civil and political rights intended by the Constitution. (Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994)
(b) Can the CHR issue an "order to desist" or restraining order?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The CHR may not issue an "order to desist" or restraining order. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures to those whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. (Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992)
(c) Is the CHR empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt? Does it have contempt powers at all?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The CHR does not possess adjudicative functions and therefore, on its own, is not empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt for issuing the "order to desist." However, under the 1987 Constitution, the CHR is constitutionally authorized, in the exercise of its investigative functions, to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR, in the course of an investigation, may only cite or hold any person in contempt and impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court. (Carino v. Commis Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)
Respondent Stern Real Estate & Development Corporation is a corporation engaged in the business of purchasing, selling and operating buildings and other real properties for profit. One such property it owns is the Hotel Rembrandt.
The respondent hotel undertook a Special Separation Program (SSP) which all employees can avail of for the limited period, due to the dire financial status it was experiencing. Forty-nine (49) employees were accepted for this separation program. The private respondents then decided that a retrenchment program was further needed in order to stem the losses. The private respondents then informed the DOLE through an Establishment Termination Report, that they were retrenching twenty-nine (29) employees. The private respondents likewise informed these twenty-nine (29) employees that their services would be terminated thirty (30) days after the receipt of the written notification. After one month from receipt of the letters of termination, the twenty-nine (29) employees were given their separation pay and the corresponding quitclaims were signed.
Petitioners were among the retrenched employees. They later filed a complaint for "illegal dismissal in the guise of retrenchment and underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay, premium compensation for holiday and rest day" with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Issue: Will retrenchment, on account of economic loss, be justified on the face of constitutional pro-labor mandate?
Ruling: Article 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes retrenchment as one of the valid causes to dismiss employees as a measure to avoid or minimize business losses. Retrenchment is the "termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation." Simply put, it is a reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to minimize losses incurred in the operation of its business. It is a management prerogative consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court.
We enumerated the requirements for a valid retrenchment which the employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) that the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) that the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and (5) that the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.
Phil-employ Services vs Rodriguez , GR 152616 , Mar 31, 2006
Anita Rodriguez applied with Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. Anita was hired and deployed for Taiwan as a domestic helper for a one-year contract with principal Chao Hung Ching in Taiwan with a monthly salary of NT$14,010.00. It was agreed that she would undergo a forty (40) days probationary period before she becomes a regular domestic helper.
During the first ten (10) days of her probationary period, respondent was observed to be inattentive and incompetent to perform her duties and responsibilities. She could not cook and do simple things as washing clothes. It was the principal’s mother-in-law who did most of the household chores, like babysitting of the child. Respondent kept insisting that she be allowed to go home on account of her incapability to perform her job. After the first ten (10) days’ work with the principal employer, complainant returned to the Philippines.
Issue: Is prior notice required in terminating a domestic helper?
Ruling: Yes. Even if it were true that Anita’s foreign employer terminated her services after 10 days of her employment, there could be no illegal dismissal as the termination was effected during the agreed probationary period. The law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute would automatically be decided in favor of labor.
However, although Anita’s employment was terminated because she failed to meet the standards of her foreign employer, still it is necessary and obligatory to afford Anita her basic right to notice. Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Security of tenure. (a) In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized causes as provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due process.
(b) The foregoing shall also apply in cases of probationary employment; provided, however, that in such cases, termination of employment due to failure of the employee to qualify in accordance with the standards of the employer made known to the former at the time of engagement may also be a ground for termination of employment.
Yrasuegui vs PAL, GR 168081, Oct. 17, 2008
Facts: On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
Issue: Will obesity justify employment termination? What is the Meiorin Test? Is it valid and constitutional?
Ruling: A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) - the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."
In British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employee's Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."
Fuentes vs Caguimbal, GR 150305, Nov 22, 2007
Facts: Honofre Fuentes is the owner of the property being claimed in this case. Said property is located in Calatagan, Batangas. On January 18, 2000, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Felomino Caguimbal with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batangas, alleging that in 1991, he allowed respondent to occupy the property rent-free, subject to the condition that the latter will vacate the property when petitioner returns from abroad. However, upon his return, respondent refused to vacate the property, forcing petitioner to file the case. Respondent denied petitioner's allegations, claiming that his father started occupying the property in 1928 as agricultural tenant until his disability in 1976, after which he (respondent) took over.
Issue: Can tenancy be presumed?
Held: No. Section 3 of R.A. No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines defines agricultural tenancy as "the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by another, for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both." The essential requisites of tenancy are: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties; (4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved.Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and the private respondents.
What was established by the evidence in the present case was that respondent and his predecessor had been planting on the property since 1928. What is wanting, however, is proof showing the sharing of harvests or that petitioner, as landowner of the subject property ever gave his consent to establish or maintain a tenancy relationship.
Tano versus Socrates
G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997
Facts: Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. One of the contentions in this case is that:
The Ordinances: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23 and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Is the preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources absolute?
Ruling: The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.” Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.
DE CASTRO HOMESITE, INC. vs. HON. EMILIO L. LEACHON
G.R. No. 124856 March 10, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner De Castro Homesite, Inc., a duly organized corporation and the owner of twelve (12) parcels of residential land in Quezon City, known as the Dupax Compound, filed a complaint against private respondents for violation of Pres. Decree No. 772.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that Pres. Decree No. 772 is unconstitutional. Said Motion was denied by the MeTC which stated that said law has not yet been declared unconstitutional by the proper tribunal. A Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.
The controversies arising from this case center on the question of the constitutionality and legality of Pres. Decree No. 772 vis-Ã -vis the adoption of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of Rep. Act No. 7279.
ISSUE: What are professional Squatters?
RULING: Article I, Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7279 defines "professional squatters" as individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term shall also apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelot or housing units by the Government but who sold, leased, transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing.
KMG vs CAO , GR 150769, Aug. 31, 2004
Facts: On January 25, 1993, the Secretary of Health wrote Dr. Orlando C. Misa, Vice President and Medical Director of the GSIS, that the Medical Services Group personnel of the GSIS were public health workers under R.A. No. 7305. However, in a letter dated January 17, 1994 written in response to a query from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) whether personnel of the Medical Department of the GSIS and the Social Security System can avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 7305, the Secretary of Health stated that the said personnel cannot be classified as public health workers until their respective agencies have been considered as health-related establishments as defined in the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7305. On June 9, 1999, GSIS Resident Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance regarding the payment of allowances under R.A. No. 7305 for January 1998 to the SIG personnel. The retroactive disallowance was made in accordance with a letter dated May 5, 1999 from the DBM stating that employees belonging to the SIG are not considered as "health-related workers" and are therefore not qualified to receive hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305. On October 29, 1999, GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, on behalf of the employees in the SIG, requested for the reconsideration of Notice of Disallowance. However, Dimagiba maintained that the disallowance was proper. The KMG, the recognized employees' union in the GSIS, appealed the disallowance of allowances under R.A. No. 7305 to the SIG personnel to the COA. However, on May 10, 2001, the COA rendered Decision No. 2001-068 affirming the disallowance of allowances for the SIG personnel. The KMG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but on November 13, 2001, the COA issued its Resolution denying the KMG's motion for reconsideration.
Issue: What does the “Magna Carta” for health workers intend to achieve
Held: R.A. No. 7305, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers," was enacted by Congress on January 28, 1992. Signed into law by then President Corazon C. Aquino on March 26, 1992, it took effect on April 17, 1992. The law aims to promote and improve the economic and social well-being as well as the living and working conditions of health workers in the public sector; to develop their skills and capabilities to make them more responsive and better equipped to deliver health projects and programs; and to attract the best and the brightest health workers to join and remain in government service. Accordingly, in addition to the basic salary of public health workers, the law provides for hazard pay, subsistence, longevity pay, laundry and remote assignment allowances for them. The GSIS, as the administrator of the funds for the pension and retirement funds of government employees, is obviously not a health or health-related establishment. Therefore, it must be established that the SIG is an office in the GSIS rendering health or health-related services for the SIG personnel to qualify as public health workers under R.A. No. 7305.
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the inescapable conclusion is that a mere incidental or slight connection between the employee's work and the delivery of health or health-related services is not sufficient to make a government employee a public health worker within the meaning of R.A. 7305. The employee must be principally engaged in the delivery of health or health-related services to be deemed a public health worker.
Philhealth vs. Chinese Gen. Hospital
G.R. No. 163123, April 15, 2005
FACTS:
Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875, otherwise known as “An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation for the Purpose,” Chinese General Hospital (CGH) had been an accredited health care provider under the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare.
CGH filed its Medicare claims which PHILHEALTH, successor of the PMCC, only gave P 1, 365, 556.32 instead of P 8, 102, 782.10 for years 1989 to 1992. CGH again filed its claims for years 1998 to 1999, amounting to P 7, 554, 342.93 but was denied for being allegedly filed beyond the 60 day period allowed by the implementing rules and regulations. Thus, upon the review of the court, petitioner Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) to pay the claims in the amount of P 14, 291, 568.71, principally on the ground of liberal application of the 60-day rule under Section 52 of RA 7875’s Implementing Rules and Regulations.
ISSUES:
What state policy is RA 7875 pursuing? In case of conflict between RA 7875 and Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which one shall prevail?
RULING:
The state policy adopted in RA 7875 sought to: a) provide all citizens of the Philippines with the mechanism to gain financial access to health services; b) create the National Health Insurance Program to serve as the means to help the people pay for the health services; c)prioritize and accelerate the provision of health services to all Filipinos, especially that segment of the population who cannot afford such services; and d) establish the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation that will administer the program at central and local levels.
The court ruled that RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not provide for any specific period within which to file claims. It can safely be presumed that the period for filing was not per se the principal concern of the legislature. The fact is that it was not RA 7875 itself but Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations which established the 60-day cut-off for the filing of claims.
While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law, these issuances are by no means iron-clad norms. Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact “bent the rules” for reasons of public interest. Thus, RA 7875 prevails over Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
GR 166676 , Sept. 12, 2008
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision dated Jan.12, 2005 of the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name “Jennifer Cagandahan” changed to “Jeff Cagandahan” and (2) gender from “female” to “male.” In her petition, she alleged that she was born on Jan. 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
ISSUE: Is a change in sex gender consistent to the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health?
RULING: In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol
GR 164774, Apr. 12, 2006
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees.
ISSUE: Is a corporate policy banning spouses from working in the same company, constitutional?
RULING:
No. The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Labor; Right to Strike (1993)
No. 15: Congressman Cheng says he is one of the co-authors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Charter. He declares that the SBMA is the answer to rapid economic growth and the attainment of the President's Philippine 2000" dream. However, Cheng is worried that foreign capital might be slow in coming in due to unstable working conditions resulting from too many strikes. To remedy this situation. Cheng proposes an amendment to SBMA law declaring it as a strike-free zone or total ban on strikes. Is this proposal legally defensible? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Art. XIII. sec. 3 of the Constitution guarantees the right of all workers to engage in peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. Thus, a law cannot totally prohibit the right to strike but can only regulate the exercise thereof. His proposal to ban strikes totally in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone is, therefore unconstitutional.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
While the Constitution guarantees to workers the right to engage in peaceful concerted activities, Including the right to strike, such right can only be exercised in accordance with law. The phrase "in accordance with law" was Inserted precisely to Indicate that in some exceptional cases workers would not have the right to strike if it is prohibited by law. Hence, the proposal to ban strikes totally in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone is constitutional. (Social Security System Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, July 28. 1989; Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)).
Exploration and Development of Minerals (1994)
No. 11: In the desire to improve the fishing methods of the fishermen, the Bureau of Fisheries, with the approval of the President, entered into a memorandum of agreement to allow Thai fishermen to fish within 200 miles from the Philippine sea coasts on the condition that Filipino fishermen be allowed to use Thai fishing equipment and vessels, and to learn modern technology in fishing and canning.
1) Is the agreement valid?
2) Suppose the agreement is for a joint venture on the same area with a Thai oil corporation for the exploration and exploitation of minerals with the Thai corporation providing technical and financial assistance. Is the agreement valid?
ANSWER;
1) No. Only Filipinos may fish in exclusive economic zone...
2) The President can enter into a memorandum of agreement with a Thai oil
corporation involving technical and financial assistance for the exploration and exploitation of minerals, but there should be no Joint venture. Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution authorizes the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for the exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. However, the same provision states the joint venture for the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken only with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per cent of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizen.
2007 BAR
The City Mayor issues an Executive Order declaring
that the city promotes responsible parenthood and upholds
natural family planning. He prohibits all hospitals operated by
the city from prescribing the use of artificial methods of
contraception, including condoms, pills, intrauterine devices
and surgical sterilization. As a result, poor women in his city
lost their access to affordable family planning programs.
Private clinics, however, continue to render family planning
counsel and devices to paying clients.
(a) Is the Executive Order in any way constitutionally
infirm? Explain.
(b) Is the Philippines in breach of any obligation under
international law? Explain.
(c) May the Commission on Human Rights order the Mayor
to stop the implementation of the Executive Order?
Explain.
1. Yes, the executive order is constitutionally infirm. For purposes of executing a law, no ordinance, order or whatever form of sub-legislation should limit or exceed whatever is provided under any law or acts of congress. Otherwise it will be contrary to the time-honored rule of "potestas delagata delegari non potest"-whatever is delegated cannot be further delegated.
In the instant case, the Mayor thru an executive order denied his constituents particularly the women to adopt any lawful method or means of family planning, which is accorded to them by a statute. The executive order, ergo, defeated the purpose of the law instead of giving life to it. Premises considered, the act of the mayor is unconstitutional.
2. No, the act of the mayor should not affect the validity of a statute the congress has enacted in order that the Philippines will cope up with its treaty obligations (Rights of women). The statute is per se legal and in consonance with the treaty which the Philippines is a signatory.
3. No, since the executive order is invalid and unconstitutional, the proper remedy is an action for a declaratory relief which must be poperly lodged before the courts and not the Commission on Human Rights.
State Principles & Policies (1994)
No. 1; What is the state policy on: a) working women?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Section 14, Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The State shall protect WORKING WOMEN by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation."
Judicial Department; Writ of Amparo (1991)
No 1: What is a Constitutional writ of Amparo and what is the basis for such a remedy under the Constitution?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The writ of Amparo in Mexican law is an extraordinary remedy whereby an interested party may seek the invalidation of any executive, legislative or judicial act deemed in violation of a fundamental right. The adoption of such a remedy in the Philippines may be based on Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution, which empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Commission on Human Rights; Power to issue TRO (1997)
No. 8 - About a hundred people occupied a parcel of land in Quezon City belonging to the city government and built shanties thereon which they utilized for dwelling, sari-sari stores, etc. The City Mayor issued an order directing
the occupants to vacate the structures within five days from notice, otherwise they would be evicted and relocated and their shanties removed, in order that the parcel of land could be converted into a park for public use and enjoyment. The inhabitants of the parcel of land complained to the Commission on Human Rights urging that the Mayor of Quezon City be stopped from doing what he has threatened to do. The Commission on Human Rights, after conducting an investigation and finding that the shanties of petitioners were already being demolished by then, ordered the Quezon City Mayor and persons Implementing his order to cease and desist from demolishing petitioners' shanties under pain of contempt.
What have you to say on the validity of the actuation of the Commission on Human Rights in relation to that of the Quezon City Mayor?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The actuation of the Commission on Human Rights is void. In Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117. the Court held that the Commission on Human Rights has no power to issue a restraining order or a writ of injunction and has no power to cite for contempt for violation of the restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. The cease and desist order, according to the Court, is a semantic Interplay for a restraining order. Its power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers, which it is constitutionally authorized to adopt.
Commission on Human Rights; Power to issue TRO (2001) No
VI - In order to implement a big government flood control project, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and a local government unit (LGU) removed squatters from the bank of a river and certain esteros for relocation to another place. Their shanties were demolished. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) conducted an investigation and issued an order for the DPWH and the LGU to cease and desist from effecting the removal of the squatters on the ground that the human rights of the squatters were being violated. The DPWH and the LGU objected to the order of the CHR Resolve which position is correct. Reasons (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER; The position of the Department of Public Works and Highways and of the local government unit is correct. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA125 (1992), no provision in the Constitution or any law confers on the Commission on Human Rights jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. The Commission on Human Rights has no judicial power. Its powers are merely investigatory.
Commission on Human Rights; Power; Limitations (Q4-2005)
(2) Squatters and vendors have put up structures in an area intended for a People's Park, which are impeding the flow of traffic in the adjoining highway. Mayor Cruz gave notice for the structures to be removed, and the area vacated within a month, or else, face demolition and ejectment. The occupants filed a case with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to stop the Mayor's move. The CHR then issued an "order to desist" against Mayor Cruz with warning that he would be held in contempt should he fail to comply with the desistance order. When the allotted time lapsed, Mayor Cruz caused the demolition and removal of the structures. Accordingly, the CHR cited him for contempt. (5%)
(a) What is your concept of Human Rights? Does this case involve violations of human rights within the scope of the CHR's jurisdiction? SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the scope of human rights includes "those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations... along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life." In the case at bar, the land adjoins a busy national highway and the construction of the squatter shanties impedes the flow of traffic. The consequent danger to life and limb cannot be ignored. It is paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Based on the circumstances obtaining in this instance, the CHR order for demolition do not fall within the compartment of human rights violations involving civil and political rights intended by the Constitution. (Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994)
(b) Can the CHR issue an "order to desist" or restraining order?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The CHR may not issue an "order to desist" or restraining order. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures to those whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. (Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992)
(c) Is the CHR empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt? Does it have contempt powers at all?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The CHR does not possess adjudicative functions and therefore, on its own, is not empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt for issuing the "order to desist." However, under the 1987 Constitution, the CHR is constitutionally authorized, in the exercise of its investigative functions, to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR, in the course of an investigation, may only cite or hold any person in contempt and impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court. (Carino v. Commis Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)
Comments
Post a Comment