Art XI, Sec2
Ombudsman vs. Mojica GR 146486
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed.
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,
ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Art XI, Sec3
Francisco vs. De Venecia GR 160261
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint, which was dismissed, against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." A day after the dismissal, a second impeachment complaint was filed against the Chief Justice. Respondent House of Representatives argues that the House impeachment Rules do not violate the Constitution (Sec. 3(5) of Art. XI), contending that the term “initiate” does not mean “to file.”
ISSUE: Should the Senate’s “sole power to try and decide impeachment cases,” be construed to mean as total exclusion of the power of judicial review?
Were there legal and constitutional bases to impeach CJ Davide?
RULING: No. Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The power of judicial review as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
The second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Davide on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Art XI, Sec4
Geduspan vs. People GR 158187
On July 11, 2002, an information was filed against petitioner Geduspan and Dr. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively, for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
RULING:
Yes. The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A. It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.
Art XI, Sec4
Adaza vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 154886
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against the spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristela Adaza. Two Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan: falsification of voucher by counterfeiting the signature of PTA President Mejoranda and falsification of DBP check by counterfeiting the signature of Mejoranda, relating to the construction of a school bldg consisting of 2 classrooms. Sandiganbayan found Mayor Adaza guilty in the first case, but acquitted him and his wife in the second case.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction if there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor?
RULING: No. For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Although petitioner was described in the information as “a public officer” there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial.
However, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against him before the proper court.
Ombudsman vs Galicia
GR 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School (MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted forming part of his 201 file, Galicia graduated from the Far Eastern University with a degree in civil engineering but failed to pass the board examinations. He also represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in education in school year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR) from the Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers' Professional Board Examination (TPBE).
Yamsuan, then principal, proceeded to verify the authenticity of the said TOR. Yamsuan was surprised to receive a reply from the College Registrar of CCPC stating that they had no record of the said TOR. Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
Issue: As between the Ombudsman and DepEd Schools Superintendent, who has the jurisdiction to investigate non-feasance and mal-feasance by public school teachers?
Ruling: The court held that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. However, in the case at bar, Galicia is estopped from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied when he participated fully in the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence and arguments in his defense. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore valid.
Ombudsman vs Armilla
GR no.160675, June 16, 2006
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Miñoza, Nelson Obeso, Senen Seriño, Ernesto Naraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City.
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.
Issue: Viewed against Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution, is the Ombudsman limited only with the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault?
Ruling: The Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
The Court further explained that the mandatory character of the Ombudsman’s order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
CALINGIN vs DESIERTO, 529 SCRA 720 (G.R. Nos. 145743-89, August 10, 2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio P. Calingin is a former mayor of Claveria, Misamis Oriental. During his incumbency, the municipality undertook a low-cost housing project known as the Bahay Ticala Housing Project (housing project). In a Resolution dated December 2, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer Jocelyn R. Araune of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended the filing of criminal charges against the petitioner and co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, and for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code based from the audit conducted by the COA. Upon review, however, Special Prosecution Officer Alberto B. Sipaco, Jr., Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended that the said Resolution be disapproved and the charges be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. On August 13, 1999, then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, respondent, disapproved the Memorandum of Sipaco and approved the Resolution of Araune.
ISSUE:
Is the Special Prosecutor co-equal to the Ombudsman or to his deputies?
RULING:
No. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor are creatures of the 1987 Constitution as provided by Sections 5, 7 and 13 of Article XI. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders. R.A. No. 6770, also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Special Prosecutor has the power and authority, under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman, to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and perform such other duties assigned to him by the Ombudsman. Verily, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to his supervision and control. In Perez v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” Clearly, in disapproving the recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to dismiss all the charges against petitioner and his co-accused, respondent Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE vs DESIERTO, 528 SCRA 9 (G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999)
FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
ISSUE:
Does the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply to both civil and criminal cases?
RULING:
No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides, “Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.” In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.” Thus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
Art 12
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN vs DENR, (G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004)
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942,5 otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.
ISSUE:
Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only?
RULING:
Accordingly, following the literal text of the Constitution provided by Section 2, Article XII, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to "technical" or "financial" assistance only. Thus, R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical agreements" in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN vs DENR, (G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004)
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court that challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
ISSUE:
Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only?
RULING:
The Court did not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement. Thus, the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, there was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression "agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)
FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
RULING:
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."
Mathews vs Taylor
Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wifebought during their marriage?
Held: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father’s estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Republic vs Estonillo
Facts: This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty on June 14, 1954.
“After due notice and publication of said application, only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army,
Issue: Does the Public Land Act require a judicial order to create a military reservation?
Held: To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect. A Court judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation effective or valid.
The Public Land Act requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove (1) that the land is alienable public land; and (2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property has taken place either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a certificate of title.
After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.
SECTION 3
SAAD versus Republic
FACTS: The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which invalidated the sale of the Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu to petitioner.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City which was ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer certificates of title that may have been subsequently issued.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: What is the Regalian Doctrine?
RULING: The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime.Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion, which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
David vs. Arroyo G.R. nos.171396
Facts: In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
issue: in times of national emergency, may the president excercise powers under section 17, article xii without congressional authority?
Ruling: the President may exercise such powers under Section 17, Article XII only under the grant of congressional approval. Certainly, the notion that congressional authority is required under Section 17, Article XII is not evident from the provision. Even Fr. Bernas notes that Section 17 does not require, as does Article VI, Section 23(2), that the authorization be "by law", thus leaving the impression that the authorization can come from the President
Matthews vs. taylor g.r. no. 164584
facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.[4] On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00.[5] The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.[6] Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.[7] All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.[8]
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Issue: can an alien nullify a lease contract entered into by his filipina wife over a land bought during their marriage?
ruling: No, he does not have any right, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
Sec. of DENR vs. yap g.r. no. 167707
Facts: Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
Issue: Is PGMA's presidential proclaimation no. 1065 classifying boracay island into 400 hectares of reserved and forest land and 628 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable) valid and constitutional?
Ruling: In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Chavez vs. PEA G.R. 133250 july 9, 2002
Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981
Issue: whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?
ruling: yes, Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Chavez vs. PEA G.R. 133250 nov. 11, 2003
Facts: Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981
Issue: whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?
ruling: yes, To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
SAAD vs. Republic
Facts: On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said lot.1 Subsequently, the subject lot was sold2 to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint3 for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive Director of the Forest Management Sector, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the area covered by Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.4 On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of respondent.5 However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint and were thus declared in default.
Issue: What is Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.19 Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.20 In instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion,21 which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee
Republic vs. Estonilo G.R. no. 157306
Facts: This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit ‘A’) on June 14, 1954.
After due notice and publication of said application, only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army
Issue: Does the Public Land Act require a judicial order to create a military reservation?
Ruling: No, it does not need any judicial order. he proviso requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims.
Furthermore, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that while Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The director of lands is required to file a petition only “whenever in the opinion of the President public interest requires it.
La Bugal B'Laan vs. DENR. G.R. no. 127882 January 21, 2004
Facts: On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,35 giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt36 to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.37
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,38 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39 Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Are Foreign-owned corporations in the large scale exploration, development and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oil limited to "technical" and "financial" assistance only?
Ruling: Yes, As priorly pointed out, the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" in the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only "technical or financial assistance." Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.228 As will be shown later, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.
Respondents insist that agreements involving "technical or financial assistance" is just another term for service contracts. They contend that the proceedings of the CONCOM indicate "that although the terminology 'service contract' was avoided [by the Constitution], the concept it represented was not." They add that "[t]he concept is embodied in the phrase 'agreements involving financial or technical assistance.'"229 And point out how members of the CONCOM referred to these agreements as "service contracts.
La Bugal B'Laan vs. DENR. G.R. no. 127882 December 1, 2004
Facts: On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,35 giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt36 to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.37
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,38 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39 Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Are Foreign-owned corporations in the large scale exploration, development and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oil limited to "technical" and "financial" assistance only?
Ruling: No, it is not limited to "technical" or financial" assistance only, the court do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue.
In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising."38
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
David versus Arroyo
SECTION 17
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: In times of national emergency, may the president exercise powers under Section 17, Article XII without congressional authority?
RULING: Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
The said provision is not self-executing as to be validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization. The provision merely declares a state economic policy during times of national emergency. As such, it cannot be taken to mean as authorizing the President to exercise "takeover" powers pursuant to a declaration of a state of national emergency.
Ombudsman vs. Mojica GR 146486
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed.
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,
ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Art XI, Sec3
Francisco vs. De Venecia GR 160261
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint, which was dismissed, against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." A day after the dismissal, a second impeachment complaint was filed against the Chief Justice. Respondent House of Representatives argues that the House impeachment Rules do not violate the Constitution (Sec. 3(5) of Art. XI), contending that the term “initiate” does not mean “to file.”
ISSUE: Should the Senate’s “sole power to try and decide impeachment cases,” be construed to mean as total exclusion of the power of judicial review?
Were there legal and constitutional bases to impeach CJ Davide?
RULING: No. Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The power of judicial review as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
The second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Davide on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Art XI, Sec4
Geduspan vs. People GR 158187
On July 11, 2002, an information was filed against petitioner Geduspan and Dr. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively, for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
RULING:
Yes. The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A. It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.
Art XI, Sec4
Adaza vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 154886
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against the spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristela Adaza. Two Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan: falsification of voucher by counterfeiting the signature of PTA President Mejoranda and falsification of DBP check by counterfeiting the signature of Mejoranda, relating to the construction of a school bldg consisting of 2 classrooms. Sandiganbayan found Mayor Adaza guilty in the first case, but acquitted him and his wife in the second case.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction if there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor?
RULING: No. For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Although petitioner was described in the information as “a public officer” there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial.
However, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against him before the proper court.
Ombudsman vs Galicia
GR 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School (MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted forming part of his 201 file, Galicia graduated from the Far Eastern University with a degree in civil engineering but failed to pass the board examinations. He also represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in education in school year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR) from the Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers' Professional Board Examination (TPBE).
Yamsuan, then principal, proceeded to verify the authenticity of the said TOR. Yamsuan was surprised to receive a reply from the College Registrar of CCPC stating that they had no record of the said TOR. Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
Issue: As between the Ombudsman and DepEd Schools Superintendent, who has the jurisdiction to investigate non-feasance and mal-feasance by public school teachers?
Ruling: The court held that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. However, in the case at bar, Galicia is estopped from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied when he participated fully in the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence and arguments in his defense. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore valid.
Ombudsman vs Armilla
GR no.160675, June 16, 2006
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Miñoza, Nelson Obeso, Senen Seriño, Ernesto Naraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City.
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.
Issue: Viewed against Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution, is the Ombudsman limited only with the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault?
Ruling: The Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
The Court further explained that the mandatory character of the Ombudsman’s order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
CALINGIN vs DESIERTO, 529 SCRA 720 (G.R. Nos. 145743-89, August 10, 2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio P. Calingin is a former mayor of Claveria, Misamis Oriental. During his incumbency, the municipality undertook a low-cost housing project known as the Bahay Ticala Housing Project (housing project). In a Resolution dated December 2, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer Jocelyn R. Araune of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended the filing of criminal charges against the petitioner and co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, and for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code based from the audit conducted by the COA. Upon review, however, Special Prosecution Officer Alberto B. Sipaco, Jr., Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended that the said Resolution be disapproved and the charges be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. On August 13, 1999, then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, respondent, disapproved the Memorandum of Sipaco and approved the Resolution of Araune.
ISSUE:
Is the Special Prosecutor co-equal to the Ombudsman or to his deputies?
RULING:
No. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor are creatures of the 1987 Constitution as provided by Sections 5, 7 and 13 of Article XI. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders. R.A. No. 6770, also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Special Prosecutor has the power and authority, under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman, to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and perform such other duties assigned to him by the Ombudsman. Verily, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to his supervision and control. In Perez v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” Clearly, in disapproving the recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to dismiss all the charges against petitioner and his co-accused, respondent Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE vs DESIERTO, 528 SCRA 9 (G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999)
FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
ISSUE:
Does the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply to both civil and criminal cases?
RULING:
No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides, “Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.” In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.” Thus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
Art 12
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN vs DENR, (G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004)
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942,5 otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.
ISSUE:
Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only?
RULING:
Accordingly, following the literal text of the Constitution provided by Section 2, Article XII, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to "technical" or "financial" assistance only. Thus, R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical agreements" in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN vs DENR, (G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004)
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court that challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
ISSUE:
Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only?
RULING:
The Court did not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement. Thus, the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, there was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression "agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)
FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
RULING:
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."
Mathews vs Taylor
Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wifebought during their marriage?
Held: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father’s estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Republic vs Estonillo
Facts: This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty on June 14, 1954.
“After due notice and publication of said application, only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army,
Issue: Does the Public Land Act require a judicial order to create a military reservation?
Held: To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect. A Court judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation effective or valid.
The Public Land Act requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove (1) that the land is alienable public land; and (2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property has taken place either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a certificate of title.
After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.
SECTION 3
SAAD versus Republic
FACTS: The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which invalidated the sale of the Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu to petitioner.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City which was ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer certificates of title that may have been subsequently issued.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: What is the Regalian Doctrine?
RULING: The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime.Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion, which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
David vs. Arroyo G.R. nos.171396
Facts: In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
issue: in times of national emergency, may the president excercise powers under section 17, article xii without congressional authority?
Ruling: the President may exercise such powers under Section 17, Article XII only under the grant of congressional approval. Certainly, the notion that congressional authority is required under Section 17, Article XII is not evident from the provision. Even Fr. Bernas notes that Section 17 does not require, as does Article VI, Section 23(2), that the authorization be "by law", thus leaving the impression that the authorization can come from the President
Matthews vs. taylor g.r. no. 164584
facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.[4] On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00.[5] The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.[6] Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.[7] All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.[8]
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Issue: can an alien nullify a lease contract entered into by his filipina wife over a land bought during their marriage?
ruling: No, he does not have any right, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
Sec. of DENR vs. yap g.r. no. 167707
Facts: Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
Issue: Is PGMA's presidential proclaimation no. 1065 classifying boracay island into 400 hectares of reserved and forest land and 628 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable) valid and constitutional?
Ruling: In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Chavez vs. PEA G.R. 133250 july 9, 2002
Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981
Issue: whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?
ruling: yes, Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Chavez vs. PEA G.R. 133250 nov. 11, 2003
Facts: Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981
Issue: whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?
ruling: yes, To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
SAAD vs. Republic
Facts: On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said lot.1 Subsequently, the subject lot was sold2 to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint3 for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive Director of the Forest Management Sector, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the area covered by Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.4 On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of respondent.5 However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint and were thus declared in default.
Issue: What is Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.19 Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.20 In instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion,21 which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee
Republic vs. Estonilo G.R. no. 157306
Facts: This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit ‘A’) on June 14, 1954.
After due notice and publication of said application, only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army
Issue: Does the Public Land Act require a judicial order to create a military reservation?
Ruling: No, it does not need any judicial order. he proviso requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims.
Furthermore, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that while Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The director of lands is required to file a petition only “whenever in the opinion of the President public interest requires it.
La Bugal B'Laan vs. DENR. G.R. no. 127882 January 21, 2004
Facts: On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,35 giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt36 to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.37
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,38 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39 Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Are Foreign-owned corporations in the large scale exploration, development and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oil limited to "technical" and "financial" assistance only?
Ruling: Yes, As priorly pointed out, the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" in the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only "technical or financial assistance." Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.228 As will be shown later, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.
Respondents insist that agreements involving "technical or financial assistance" is just another term for service contracts. They contend that the proceedings of the CONCOM indicate "that although the terminology 'service contract' was avoided [by the Constitution], the concept it represented was not." They add that "[t]he concept is embodied in the phrase 'agreements involving financial or technical assistance.'"229 And point out how members of the CONCOM referred to these agreements as "service contracts.
La Bugal B'Laan vs. DENR. G.R. no. 127882 December 1, 2004
Facts: On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,35 giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt36 to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.37
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,38 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39 Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Are Foreign-owned corporations in the large scale exploration, development and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oil limited to "technical" and "financial" assistance only?
Ruling: No, it is not limited to "technical" or financial" assistance only, the court do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue.
In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising."38
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
David versus Arroyo
SECTION 17
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: In times of national emergency, may the president exercise powers under Section 17, Article XII without congressional authority?
RULING: Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
The said provision is not self-executing as to be validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization. The provision merely declares a state economic policy during times of national emergency. As such, it cannot be taken to mean as authorizing the President to exercise "takeover" powers pursuant to a declaration of a state of national emergency.
Comments
Post a Comment