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INCHAUSTI & CO. vs.GREGORIO

INCHAUSTI & CO. vs.GREGORIO
G.R. No. L-7721 March 25, 1914

This suit is brought for the recovery of a certain sum of money, the balance of a current account opened by the firm of Inchausti & Company with Teodoro Yulo and after his death continued with his widow and children, whose principal representative is Gregorio Yulo. Gregorio Yulo, for himself and in representation of his brothers executed on June 26, 1908, a notarial document whereby all admitted their indebtedness to Inchausti & Company in the sum of P203,221.27 and, in order to secure the same with interest thereon at 10 % / annum, they especially mortgaged an undivided six-ninth of their thirty-eight rural properties, their remaining urban properties, lorchas, and family credits which were listed, obligating themselves to make a forma inventory and to describe in due form all the said properties.
On January 11, 1909, Gregorio Yulo in representation of Hijos de T. Yulo answered a letter of the firm of Inchausti & Company in these terms: "With your favor of the 2d inst. ..we desire to express our entire conformity as also with the balance in your favor of P271,863.12." On July 17, 1909, Inchausti & Company informed Hijos de T. Yulo of the reduction of the said balance to P253,445.42, with which balance Hijos de T. Yulo expressed its conformity.
On August 12, 1909, Gregorio Yulo, for himself and in representation of his brother Manuel Yulo, and in their own behalf Pedro Yulo, Francisco Yulo, Carmen Yulo, and Concepcion Yulo, the latter being of age at the time, executed the notarial instrument.Through this, the said persons, including Concepcion Yulo ratified all the contents of the prior document of June 26, 1908, severally and jointly acknowledged and admitted their indebtedness to Inchausti & Company for the net amount of P253,445.42 which they obligated themselves to pay, with interest at ten per cent per annum, in five installments at the rate of P50,000, except the last, this being P53,445.42, beginning June 30, 1910, continuing successively on the 30th of each June until the last payment on June 30, 1914.
This instrument was neither ratified nor confirmed by Mariano Yulo. The Yulos, brothers and sisters, who executed the preceding instrument, did not pay the first installment of the obligation. Therefore, on March 27, 1911, Inchausti & Company brought an ordinary action in the CFI of Iloilo, against Gregorio Yulo for the payment of the said balance due of P253,445.42 with interest at 10% per annum, on that date aggregating P42,944.76.
But, on May 12, 1911, Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen Yulo y Regalado executed in favor Inchausti & Company another notarial instrument in recognition of the debt and obligation of payment in the ff terms: "1. the debt is reduce for them to P225,000; 2.the interest is likewise reduced for them to 6 % per annum, from March 15, 1911; 3. installments are increase to 8, the first of P20,000, beginning on June 30, 1911, and the rest of P30,000 each on the same date of each successive year until the total obligation shall be finally and satisfactorily paid on June 30, 1919," it being expressly agreed "that if any of the partial payments specified in the foregoing clause be not paid at its maturity, the amount of the said partial payment together with its interest shall bear interest at the rate of 15 % per annum from the date of said maturity, without the necessity of demand until its complete payment."
ISSUE: Did the court err in considering the contract of May 12, 1911, as constituting a novation of that of August 12, 1909?
There can also be no doubt that the contract of May 12, 1911, does not constitute a novation of the former one of August 12, 1909, with respect to the other debtors who executed this contract, or more concretely, with respect to the defendant Gregorio Yulo: First, because "in order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes it, it is necessary that it should be so expressly declared or that the old and the new be incompatible in all points" (Civil Code, article 1204); and the instrument of May 12, 1911, far from expressly declaring that the obligation of the three who executed it substitutes the former signed by Gregorio Yulo and the other debtors, expressly and clearly stated that the said obligation of Gregorio Yulo to pay the two hundred and fifty-three thousand and odd pesos sued for exists, stipulating that the suit must continue its course and, if necessary, these three parties who executed the contract of May 12, 1911, would cooperate in order that the action against Gregorio Yulo might prosper, with other undertakings concerning the execution of the judgment which might be rendered against Gregorio Yulo in this same suit. "It is always necessary to state that it is the intention of the contracting parties to extinguish the former obligation by the new one" There exist no incompatibility between the old and the new obligation as will be demonstrated in the resolution of the last point, and for the present we will merely reiterate the legal doctrine that an obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a new instrument wherein the old is ratified, by changing only the term of payment and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one.
Sentencing Gregorio Yulo to pay 253,445 pesos and 42 centavos of August 12, 1909, this debtor, if he should pay all this sum, could not recover from his joint debtors Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen their proportional parts of the P253,445.42 which he had paid, inasmuch as the three were not obligated by virtue of the instrument of May 12, 1911, to pay only 225,000 pesos, thus constituting a violation of Gregorio Yulo's right under such hypothesis, of being reimbursed for the sum paid by him, with the interest of the amounts advanced at the rate of one-sixth part from each of his five codebtors. (Civ. Code, article 1145, par. 2). This result would have been a ponderous obstacle against the prospering of the suit as it had been brought. It would have been very just then to have absolved the solidary debtor who having to pay the debt in its entirety would not be able to demand contribution from his codebtors in order that they might reimburse him pro rata for the amount advanced for them by him. But such hypothesis must be put out of consideration by reason of the fact that occurred during the pendency of the action, which fact the judge states in his decision. "In this contract of May last," he says, "the amount of the debt was reduced to P225,000 and the attorney of the plaintiff admits in his plea that Gregorio Yulo has a right to the benefit of this reduction This is a fact which this Supreme Court must hold as firmly established, considering that the plaintiff in its brief, on page 27, corroborates the same in these words: "What effect," it says, "could this contract have over the rights and obligations of the defendant Gregorio Yulo with respect to the plaintiff company? In the first place, we are the first to realize that it benefits him with respect to the reduction of the amount of the debt. The obligation being solidary, the remission of any part of the debt made by a creditor in favor of one or more of the solidary debtors necessarily benefits the others, and therefore there can be no doubt that, in accordance with the provision of article 1143 of the Civil Code, the defendant has the right to enjoy the benefits of the partial remission of the debt granted by the creditor."
Wherefore we hold that although the contract of May 12, 1911, has not novated that of August 12, 1909, it has affected that contract and the outcome of the suit brought against Gregorio Yulo alone for the sum of P253,445.42; and in consequence thereof, the amount stated in the contract of August 12, 1909, cannot be recovered but only that stated in the contract of May 12, 1911, by virtue of the remission granted to the three of the solidary debtors in this instrument, in conformity with what is provided in article 1143 of the Civil Code, cited by the creditor itself.
The defendant Gregorio Yulo cannot be ordered to pay the P253,445.42 claimed from him in the suit here, because he has been benefited by the remission made by the plaintiff to three of his codebtors, many times named above. Consequently, the debt is reduced to 225,000 pesos.
But, as it cannot be enforced against the defendant except as to the three-sixths part which is what he can recover from his joint codebtors Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen, at present, judgment can be rendered only as to the P112,500.

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