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POE, Jr. vs. Arroyo, PET case no. 0002, March 29, 2005

FACTS: Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) against the proclaimed winner of the 2004 presidential elections. During the pendency of the case, FPJ died. His widow, Susan Roces, claimed before the PET that there was an urgent need for her to substitute her husband in the election protest that he had filed as it is of paramount interest to the Filipino people.

ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s presidential protest case?

RULING: No. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides that only the registered candidate for President or Vice President of the Philippines who has received the second or third highest number of votes may timely contest the election of the proclaimed winner. Furthermore, a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property capable of being transmitted to his heirs upon his death. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Thus, Susan Roces, is not a real-party-in-interest to the election protest of her husband FPJ.

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