PRC vs. De Guzman
Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the  Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”
Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers
Chavez vs. COMELEC
Fact: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and image for 96° North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation involved in the amusement and video games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two showed petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96° North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and amusement parlors of G-Box.
Issue: Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No, Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?
MMDA vs. Garin
Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:
You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days.
Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of apprehension.1
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Issue: Did Rep. Act no. 7924 vest MMDA police power/
Ruling: No, Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.
MMDA vs. Vron Transportation
Facts: Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation,9 filed a petition for declaratory relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.
In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation."12 This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Issue: Will the elimination of the terminal a valid exercise of police powers by the MMDA
Ruling: No, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only because no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.
Lucena Grand Terminal vs. JAC Liner
Facts: Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies
Issue: Is Lucena Ordinance no. 1631 a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling:Yes, City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena
OSG vs. Ayala Land Inc.
Facts: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.
Issue: Is requiring owners to provide free parking, valid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No, in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Assn. of the Phils.
Facts: the PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself
Issue: Is pilotage a property right? Is A.O. 04-92 violative of due process?
Ruling: Yes, The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right
No, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee’s performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA’s jurisdictional area
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Assn.
Facts: Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules - the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Issue: Is a Threatened demolition of a dwelling within the right of life, liberty and property?
Ruling: No, The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Republic vs. Marcos
Facts: On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks
Issue: Is R.A. 1379 violative of due process?
Ruling: No, In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379
Lagcao vs. Labra
Facts: On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.3
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.1avvphi1
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters.
Issue: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of substantive due process
Ruling: Yes, Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners’ right to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners’ lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
Lim vs. Malate Tourist Dev. Corp
Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional
Issue: Is closure ordinance violative of the due process?
Ruling: Yes, Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Health care vs. Duque
Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
Issue: Is the Milk code violative of due process clause?
Ruling: No, he Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
Issue: Is the Plunder Law “void for being vague”
Ruling: this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL
This due to the fact that Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law
Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn, requested the Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines to make a thorough review of the forensic evidence in the double murder case. The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorney’s Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.
Issue: were the accused denied of due process entitling them to re trial?
Ruling: no, The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the contentions of the petitioners but finds no basis for the allegation that the respondent Sandiganbayan has gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.
The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition is a labor in vain. Basically, only questions of fact are raised. Not only is it axiomatic that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within specifically recognized exceptions to the rule but from the petition and its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the respondent Court correctly resolved the factual issues
Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari, dated December 13, 1996 seeks the nullification of the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated August 18, 1994 and October 22, 1996. The first assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed against them, while the second questioned Resolution denied their motion for reconsideration.
Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 4, 1992, claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income.
Issue: Is the respondent in forfeiture proceeding entitled of due process?
Ruling: no, it is clarified therein that the doctrine laid down in Almeda v. Perez that forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature applies purely to the procedural aspect of such proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein
Bangko sentral vs. Pilipino Rural Bank
Facts: In September of 2007, the Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducted examinations of the books of the following banks: Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. (RBPI), Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc., Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., Rural Bank of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc. (now Dynamic Rural Bank), Rural Bank of Darbci, Inc., Rural Bank of Kananga (Leyte), Inc. (now First Interstate Rural Bank), Rural Bank de Bisayas Minglanilla (now Bank of East Asia), and San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.
Issue: what is “close now, hear later scheme”? ; does “close now, hear later scheme” of the Monetary board violate procedural due process
Ruling: “close now, hear later” scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public
Yes, The trial court required the MB to respect the respondent banks’ right to due process by allowing the respondent banks to view the ROEs and act upon them to forestall any sanctions the MB might impose. Such procedure has no basis in law and does in fact violate the “close now, hear later” doctrine
ABAKADA, et al. vs. Ermita
Facts: They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Issue: Is Sec. 8 Of R.A. 9337 of the Evat law violative of the equal protection clause?
Ruling: No, Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: “[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: …”
Brilliante vs. People
Facts: On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay.3
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same. Angel Gonong, a writer for the People’s Journal, wrote a news article entitled "Binay Accused of Plotting Slays of Rivals." It was cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the People’s Journal. Gloria Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled "Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco" which was cleared for publication by Augusto Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the News Today.
Issue: Was Brillainte’s right to equal protection of the law violated?
Ruling: NO, The Court agrees with the appellate court that Brillante’s right to equal protection of the laws was not violated when he was convicted of libel while his co-accused were acquitted.
The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather, it permits of reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another.87 It is sufficient that the law operates equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.